We provide tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the equilibrium payo sets for repeated games under both perfect and imperfect public monitoring. The distance between the equilibrium payo set and its limit vanishes at rate (1 − δ) 1/2 under perfect monitoring, and at rate (1 − δ) 1/4 under imperfect monitoring. For strictly individually rational payo vectors, these rates improve to 0 (i.e., all strictly individually rational payo vectors are exactly achieved as equilibrium payos for δ high enough) and (1 − δ) 1/2 , respectively.
since then (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin, 1994 ; Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille, 2011, etc.), but it has also been successfully extended to games with private monitoring.
One of the downsides of asymptotic analysis is its lack of nuance. Whether the folk theorem holds or not depends on linear algebraic properties of the monitoring structure (e.g., the rank of the matrix that summarizes it). Fixing this rank, the amount of noise is irrelevant for the limit characterization. To be sure, Kandori (1992) shows that for any xed discount factor, the equilibrium payo set becomes weakly larger as signals become more informative about players' actions. As remarkable as this result may be, it does not help quantify how noise aects equilibrium outcomes. Yet, it is important to know whether the limit characterization is a reasonable approximation for the game with a xed but high discount factor, in the range of values that are usually used in calibration exercises.
Similar frustration arises in other sciences, in which asymptotic methods allow clear-cut results that are seemingly out of reach for xed discounting. Undiscounted models are routinely used in engineering and operations research, in particular. However, it is also standard practice in these disciplines to complement such models with an analysis of the rate of convergence (see, for instance, Whitt, 1974 , for a survey in queueing; Altman and Zeitouni, 1994, more recently).
1 As imperfect a measure as such a rate might be, it is the next best thing to an exact characterization for xed discounting.
The goal of this paper is to provide such an analysis for repeated games under perfect as well as imperfect public monitoring. Throughout, we maintain standard assumptions that ensure that the limit (as discounting vanishes) equilibrium payo set is the entire feasible and individually rational payo set.
2
Our results are as follows. First, under perfect monitoring: the (subgame perfect) equilibrium payo set converges to its limit at a rate at least as fast as (1 − δ) 1/2 (Proposition 1). We show by an example that this rate is tight (Proposition 2). However, there are two caveats to this result.
First, all strictly individually rational payo vectors, often including a large part of the Pareto frontier, are exactly achieved as equilibrium payos for high enough discount factors. Second, the example showing that the rate (1 − δ) 1/2 is tight is non-generic. Generically (in the sense of This is not to say that rates of convergence have not been studied in economics (and not only with respect to the discount rate, in particular, with respect to growth); see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Ortigueira and Santos (1997) , among many other examples in macroeconomics. Rates of convergence also play a critical role in econometric theory.
That is, the folk theorem holds as stated by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) in the case of perfect monitoring and by Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) in the case of imperfect public monitoring.
stage-game payos), the rate can be improved to 1 − δ (Proposition 3).
Second, under imperfect public monitoring: the (perfect public) equilibrium payo set converges to its limit at a rate at least as fast as (1 − δ) 1/4 (Proposition 5) . Here as well, we show by an example that this rate is tight (Proposition 6). In this case also, the result comes with two caveats. First, strictly individually rational payo vectors can be approached at rate (1 − δ) 1 We also show that faster rates can be obtained for an important class of monitoring structures, namely, all-or-nothing monitoring, in which the action prole is either perfectly observed (with some probability) or not at all. For such structures, the rate is (1 − δ) 1/2 , and generically 1 − δ (consequences of Lemma 7).
3
The spread between these rates is signicant for applications. For instance, using a discount rate of 1 − δ = 2%, as is frequently done in applications to macroeconomics, it holds that (1 − δ) 1/2 ≈ 14%, and (1 − δ) 1/4 ≈ 38%. In a standard prisoner's dilemma (Section 4.2), the ecient payo vector is achieved under perfect monitoring (given that particular choice of δ), but the loss under imperfect monitoring is of the order (1 − δ) 1/2 ≈ 14%. 4 From a theoretical point of view, our results establish that the type of monitoring structure makes a quantitative dierence in terms of rates of convergence, even under those assumptions that guarantee that there is no asymptotic dierence whatsoever.
Related Literature: Surprisingly, we seem to be the rst to study the rate of convergence in non-zero-sum discounted repeated games. Obviously, a similar exercise has been carried out in related areas. We start with a brief overview of those.
There is a sizable literature on the rate of convergence of the value in zero-sum games (both repeated and stochastic games). In the case of one-sided incomplete information and perfect monitoring, Aumann and Maschler (1967) establish that the value converges at rate (1 − δ) 1/2 .
5
! On the other hand, product monitoring, as is often assumed, does not improve the rate of convergence. To the contrary, to the extent that, under full support, Nash equilibria and perfect public equilibria are payo-equivalent for such games, our results extend to Nash equilibrium payos.
" Clearly, the constant of proportionality matters. Our analysis leaves open the question on how this constant can be bounded in terms of stage-game payos and the monitoring structure.
# As far as we can tell, the coincidence of this rate with the one we derive for non-zero-sum games with perfect monitoring is fortuitous, although, as in our case, the rate can be substantially improved in specic classes of games, see Zamir (197172) . Mertens (1998) extends the analysis to the case of imperfect monitoring. The rate (1 − δ) 1/3 then plays a prominent role.
The rate of convergence of the value of Markov decision processes (the special case of a stochastic game with only one player) has been thoroughly investigated. It has been shown that, under fairly weak assumptions (e.g., Yushkevich, 1996) , the rate of convergence is 1 − δ. 6
In discounted zero-sum stochastic games under perfect monitoring, Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) show that the value admits a Puiseux series in the discount rate 1−δ. More specically, as a function of the dimension of the game (the cardinality of the state and action sets), there exists an integer N such that the value admits an expansion in powers of the form i/k, i = 0, . . . , k, for some integer k ≤ N , in some neighborhood of δ = 1. As is well known, there is surprising exibility in reverse-engineered games with specic power expansions.
In repeated games, some questions related to the rate of convergence have been examined before. In particular, authors have asked whether (i) the Pareto frontier can be exactly achieved under imperfect monitoring for high discount factors, and (ii) payo vectors that exactly give a player his minmax payo (as opposed to strictly more) can be achieved for high discount factors under perfect monitoring. Relative to these results, we provide a measure of the rate at which the equilibrium payo set approaches the Pareto frontier. Regarding (ii), see Thomas (1995) as well as Berg and Kärki (2014) .
Finally, some papers consider particular games and derive exhaustive analyses of the equilibrium payo set under perfect monitoring, as a function of the discount factor. For the prisoner's dilemma, these include Stahl (1991) and Mailath, Obara and Sekiguchi (2002).
We discuss some of these papers further as we proceed.
$ Obviously, in the case of a single state, as in the case of a repeated game, the rate is 0. 
= min
denote the set of feasible and individually rational payo vectors.
7 Throughout, we maintain the assumption that F + has non-empty interior. Let
denote the lowest payo that player i can receive in F + . Obviously, v i ≥ 0 for all i, and the inequality can be strict for some i. 8 This stage game is repeated innitely many times. Monitoring is imperfect and public. We let Y denote the nite set of public signals, and π : A → ∆(Y ) describe the monitoring structure. Section 3 is concerned with the special case of perfect monitoring, which obtains when Y = A and π(· | a) assigns probability 1 to y = a for all a. We say that a mixed action prole α has individual full rank for player i if {π(· | a i , α −i ) : a i ∈ A i } is linearly independent; it has pairwise full rank for distinct players i and
% We let conv S refer to the convex hull of S ⊆ R n . & For example, consider the following two-player stage game:
In this game, both players have minmax payos of 0, whereas v 1 = 1/3.
The game unfolds as follows. In each of the rounds t = 1, 2, . . ., players simultaneously choose actions. Given the action prole a ∈ A, a public signal y is then drawn with probability π(y | a).
In addition, players privately know the actions that they have chosen in the past. We assume that no player observes his reward.
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Formally, a public history at the start of round t is a sequence h t = (y 1 , . . . , y t−1 ). We set 
A (behavior) strategy for player i is a map σ i :
A strategy prole σ generates a probability distribution over histories in the obvious way and thus also a distribution over sequences of players' rewards. Each player seeks to maximize his payo, that is, the average discounted sum of his rewards, using a common discount factor δ < 1. Give that players follow the strategy prole σ, the payo of player i is dened as
A strategy σ i is called public if it depends on the public history only, and not on player i's private information. That is, a public strategy is a map σ i : H → ∆(A i ). A perfect public equilibrium is a prole of public strategies such that, given any period t and public history h t , the strategy prole is a Nash equilibrium from that period on. Perfect public equilibrium is a restrictive equilibrium concept, but it is the only tractable one known to date. Most of the papers on public monitoring focus on such equilibria. So do we. Perfect public equilibrium reduces to subgame perfect equilibrium in the case of perfect monitoring.
We let E(δ) denote the (compact) set of perfect public equilibrium payo vectors for any given discount factor δ < 1. Because attention is restriction to perfect public equilibrium, E(δ) ⊆ F + .
monitoring (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986 ) and under imperfect public monitoring and standard rank assumptions (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin, 1994 
Perfect Monitoring
This section focuses on perfect monitoring. In Section 3.1, we prove that the subgame perfect equilibrium payo set converges to the set of feasible and individually rational payos at a rate at least as fast as (1 − δ) 1/2 (Proposition 1). We also show by an example that the rate (1 − δ)
is tight (Proposition 2).
Yet, for a given game, only some vertices of F + are problematic. In Section 3.2, we review sucient conditions for particular vertices to be approached at faster rates. In particular, strictly individually rational payo vectors are exactly achieved for low enough discounting.
Furthermore, not all stage games exhibit such slow convergence. Proposition 3 establishes that the rate can be improved to 1 − δ for generic stage games.
A Tight Bound
To understand why the rate of convergence is precisely (1 − δ) 
where the left-hand side represents the foregone ow payo during the minmaxing phase which the deviation triggers, and the right-hand side is the one-period benet from the deviation.
On the other hand, subgame perfection requires player 2 to be willing to carry out the minmaxing. Hence, right after the deviation, his continuation payo must be positive. Hence, it must be that −
By multiplying each side of (1) and (2), canceling out 1 − δ T and taking the square root, we 
for any δ < 1.
Proof. For simplicity, we assume a public randomization device. Further, we assume that mixed actions are observable. We can dispense with both assumptions, following standard arguments (Sorin, 1986; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1991 ).
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For the rst statement, x any vertex v of F + . Because the interior of F + is non-empty, we 
Following closely Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), we shall construct a strategy prole that achieves payo v 1 (δ) for δ close to 1. The strategy prole can be described in terms of reward phases and punishment phases, as in their construction. Unlike in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), however, the length of each punishment phase depends on δ. More specically, given δ, pick the
Play starts in phase R 1 in the initial period. In each phase, play proceeds as follows, according
Reward phase R i : action prole α i ∈ ∆ (A) is played (possibly taking advantage of the public randomization device), where u (α i ) = v i (δ). 12 Play stays in phase R i unless a player j unilaterally deviates, in which case play moves to phase P j .
Punishment phase P i : The minmaxing action prole α i is played. Play stays in phase P i for either T (δ) periods, or until there is a unilateral deviation by some j, whichever comes rst. In the former case, play transits to phase R i .
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In the latter, it transits to phase P j .
To prove that this strategy prole is a subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the one-shot
Thereafter, we will sometimes suppress the dependency of variables on δ if they stay bounded (or bounded away from baseline constants) as δ → 1 and do not aect our asymptotic analysis. ! In case j = i, we restart the count of periods.
deviation principle in dierent phases in turn.
i follows, since the left-hand side is even higher.
and it is sucient to consider t = T (δ). It suces that
) .
This condition is satised for δ close to 1 since two terms δ
dominate all other terms as δ → 1 and l j >ū. The argument for the minmaxed player (j = i) is standard, as he is taking a short-run best-reply and deviating would only postpone the date at which his ow payo is positive again.
Note that F + is a convex polytope, and so has nitely many vertices, and note that E(δ) is convex because we assume the public randomization device. Hence, the second statement follows
We now show by an example that the rate is tight. Consider the two-player stage game represented in Figure 2 . Each player's minmax payo is 0, and
This example has all the properties used in the heuristic of equations (1) and (2): player 2's payo is always lower than player 1's by feasibility, and minmaxing player 1 drives player 2's payo below his own minmax payo, costing him one per period of punishment, while player 1 
player 1 for T periods costs 1 − δ T to player 2, and so 1 − δ T must be less than δ T v 2 , where v 2 is the payo player 2 gets at the end of the punishment (and hence also less than v 1 ), else minmaxing is not individually rational.
14 Proposition 2 In the stage game of Figure 2 under perfect monitoring, there exists κ > 0 such that, for any δ < 1, there is no subgame perfect equilibrium payo within the distance
Proof. One can easily show that (0, 0) / ∈ E(δ) for any δ < 1.
)}, and line p be the line segment that connects (p, 0) and (
). See Figure 3 . Note that the vector (0, − 1 2 ) lies on the extension of line p in the left-down direction. This geometric property will be used later. For
For any δ close to 1, it follows from the maximality of p(δ) and the compactness of E(δ) that E(δ)∩line p(δ) is non-empty. Pick any v(δ) ∈ E(δ)∩line p(δ) . Pick any subgame perfect equilibrium that achieves v(δ). We denote by α the (mixed) action prole played in the rst period, and by w(a, δ) ∈ E(δ) the continuation payo vector after (realized) action prole a.
)}, and hence α 2 (R) ≥ 1 2 .
Since player 1 has no incentive to deviate to U , we have
Solving this inequality, we have
Faster Rates for Particular Payo Vertices or Generic Games
Arguably, the rate of convergence (1 − δ) 
Then there exists 
Then there exists K v > 0 such that for any δ < 1, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium whose payo is within the distance
In words, the rst two conditions stated in the lemma are that any player who receives his minmax payo at the vertex of interest must have an action that yields strictly less than his minmax payo. Under these conditions, we can pick the duration T i of player i's punishment phase to be uniformly bounded in δ. If these conditions are violated, i.e., if 
(note that I or its complement can be empty). For every i ∈ I, by the assumption, for each j ̸ = i,
with some k i > 0 (to be chosen later) and η > 0. For every i / ∈ I, we proceed as before, dening
with some k i , l i > 0 (to be chosen later).
For i ∈ I, the length T i (δ) of punishment phase P i (during which player i is minmaxed and best replies) is chosen such that ⌊δ
This ensures that player j ̸ = i has no protable deviation during P i for δ high enough. We pick k i > 0 such that εk i > 2ū and hence δ
This ensures
postponed payo given punishment , and so player i has no incentive to deviate from R i either (the cost of a suboptimal action depends on the randomization device, and is at most (1 − δ)ū) . By construction, he has no incentive to deviate during P i . Also, with xed η > 0, player j ̸ = i has no incentive to deviate from R i for δ high enough.
For i / ∈ I, the construction is as in Proposition 1, with the adjustment that if
, then we further specify that player i plays a pure action yielding a strictly negative payo against α i −i during P i and that a deviation from the pure action restarts the punishment. Since v i > 0 or the above case applies, ow payos during P i are below v i − η with some xed η > 0. Combined with the restart policy, this allows us to take the length T i of punishment phase P i to be independent of δ and yet a deviation from P i unattractive to i.
We can also pick l j > 0, j ̸ = i, such that deviating from P i is not protable for players j ̸ = i. 
There are examples in which the rate of convergence is 1 − δ, and which are robust to payo perturbations, and so the rate 1 − δ cannot be improved generically. However, there are also robust examples in which the rate is 0. 3 The randomization over actions that might help detecting deviations at the expense of eciency.
As we will see, imperfect monitoring can make Cause 1 even worse (see Proposition 6 below).
Proposition 4 illustrates Cause 2. Cause 3 is assumed away by the rank assumptions that we will impose.
Let us now illustrate Cause 2 and show that any punishment, even if it is approximately along the hyperplane, entails positive surplus destruction. We illustrate this surplus destruction by considering the prisoner's dilemma described in Figure 4 .
18 Each player's minmax payo is 0, ).
Let F p be the subset of F + that excludes the neighborhood of (2, 2) separated by the arc arc p .
See Figure 5 . Since (2, 2) / ∈ E(δ), for each δ < 1 close to 1, we can nd the largest p = p(δ) >
For any δ close to 1, it follows from the maximality of p(δ) and the compactness of E(δ) that
, and denote by λ the unit vector normal to the arc arc p(δ) at point v(δ). Pick an arbitrary perfect public equilibrium that achieves v(δ). We denote by α the action prole played in the rst period, and by w(y, δ) ∈ E(δ) the continuation payo vector after signal y. Note that for δ close to 1, both α 1 and α 2 put positive probabilities on C.
Since α i puts a positive probability on C, for each i = 1, 2, we have
arc p Figure 5 : The shaded area depicts F p , and the inside arc depicts arc p .
Thus w i (·, δ) must vary by at least 1 − δ.
On the other hand, for each y ∈ Y , we have
Note that, since v(δ) ∈ arc p(δ) , λ · ((2, 2) − v(δ)) is of order p(δ), and hence ε(δ) is of order p(δ)(1 − δ). Note also that, for δ close to 1, each w(y, δ) ∈ F p(δ) is inside the circle Γ p(δ) .
Therefore, w(·, δ) can vary in the direction tangent to λ by at most 2(r(δ)
Combining the above arguments, p(δ)(1 − δ) 1/2 is of order at least 1 − δ, hence p(δ) is of order
The intuition is simple and can already be gleaned from a careful reading of the proof by (along the relevant direction). To allow for the payos w to be both 1 − δ apart, yet within p(δ)(1 − δ) of the maximum, the best case scenario is that the boundary be nearly orthogonal to the direction under consideration. Yet, without loss, we can focus on a point at which the curvature of E(δ) is non-zero; indeed, at least of order
. Hence, points that are p(δ) (1 − δ) away from the the same boundary point can only be p(δ) ( 
A Tight Bound
We start with showing that the rate of convergence is at least as fast as (1 − δ) 1/4 . Recall that the folk theorem holds if, on top of our maintained assumption that F + is full-dimensional, rst, for every player i, there exists a minmax action prole that has individual full rank for any j ̸ = i, and second, every pure action prole has pairwise full rank for any distinct pair of players.
19 The rst assumption (individual full rank) ensures that signals are suciently rich for deviations from a prescribed minmax action prole to be statistically detectable, and so to be punishable; the second (pairwise full rank) ensures that signals are so rich that deviations from pure action proles are not only detected (statistically), but also ascribed to a specic player. This allows surplus to be redistributed rather than destroyed, in case a deviation gets detected, so that eciency, for instance, does not need to be sacriced despite the occurrence of punishments. The next result relies on these assumptions.
Proposition 5 Fix a nite stage game under imperfect public monitoring in which for every player i, there exists a minmax action prole with individual full rank for any j ̸ = i, and that every pure action prole has pairwise full rank for any distinct pair of players. Then there exists
for any δ < 1. 
' Weaker sucient assumptions for the folk theorem to hold are known. In particular, it suces that the relevant action prole can be approximated by a sequence of action proles that have (individual, pairwise) full rank.
We let ∥v∥ :
where the supremum is taken over α ∈ ×
Intuitively, we may think of λ as the weights assigned to players' payos (although they can be negative), and v as the vector that maximizes weighted utilitarian welfare. The designer chooses transfers x to incentivize players to choose an action prole that delivers v (net of the transfers), subject to these transfers being budget-balanced, using the same weights λ in the constraint.
The maximum value is referred to as the score (in direction λ).
For anyx > 0, we denote by k(λ,x) the value of Fudenberg-Levine's program with the additional constraints ∥x(y)∥ ≤x for every y ∈ Y . Also, let
Under the assumptions in Proposition 5, for any λ,
We show that this convergence is uniform in λ and of rate
Lemma 2 There exists
and anyx > 0.
Proof. For a large L 0 (to be chosen, depending only on the stage-game structure, and not on 
Note that such x i (·) is independent of λ. Second, we substitute x 2 (y) = − 
Since a has pairwise full rank for players 1 and 2, there exists x 1 (·) that satises the above condition. Note that |x 1 (y)| is of order
we can choose L 0 large enough to satisfy ∥x(y)∥ ≤x (for large enoughx).
In case (b), without loss of generality, we assume |λ 2 
. We further assume 
is feasible in Fudenberg-Levine's program with λ. Therefore, for large enoughx, we
Next, we record two geometric lemmas. 
Then it is easy to show that α is enforceable with continuation payo vector w(·, δ), and the total payo vector is v(δ).
All is left to show is that w(y, δ) ∈ W (δ). By the construction of W (δ), it suces to show that w(y, δ) belongs to the ball B(δ) with center v(δ) − r(δ)λ and radius r(δ). Note rst that
On the other hand,
Therefore, for δ high enough, we have ∥w(
1/2 . By Lemma 4, we have
w(y, δ) ∈ B(δ).
As a remark, notice that our individual and pairwise full rank conditions are used in the proof of Lemma 2 only. Therefore, even if the full rank condition holds only approximately, as long as Lemma 2 holds, the same rate (1 − δ) 1/4 applies. Moreover, if there exist β > 0 and K 0 > 0
x β for any λ ∈ S n−1 and anyx > 0, then we can obtain the rate of
(Proposition 5 can be regarded as a special case with β = 1.)
We now show that the rate (1 − δ) 1/4 is tight. Recall the two-player stage game of Figure 2 .
Assume that the monitoring structure has full support, and every pure action prole has pairwise full rank condition for players 1 and 2, and hence Proposition 5 applies. This example shows that the rate (1 − δ) 1/4 is tight. Roughly speaking, the slow rate arises because near coordinate directions, such as negative coordinate (minmax) directions, it is no longer possible to minimize surplus destruction by shifting continuation payos across players. To avoid continuation payos to interfere with the minmaxed player's incentives, we must pick these payos well inside the equilibrium payo, and this minimum distance exacerbates the ineciency. To put it dierently, in non-coordinate directions, it is possible to halve the ineciency of (1 − δ) 1/4 across players, but that is no longer possible in coordinate directions. The same issue arises in positive coordinate directions; see Propositions 7 and 8.
Proposition 6 In the stage game of Figure 2 under imperfect public monitoring with full support, there exists κ > 0 such that for any δ < 1, there is no perfect public equilibrium payo within the distance κ(1 − δ)
of (0, 0).
Proof. We prove this proposition by contradiction. Let d(δ) denote the distance between E(δ) and (0, 0). Suppose that there exists a sequence {δ m } m∈N of discount factors such that ) and radius r. Let arc p,r denote the arc between (p, 0) and ≈ (p, p). Let 
For any δ close to 1, it follows from the maximality of p(δ) and the compactness of )},
Since player 1 has no incentive to deviate from
, w 1 (·, δ) must vary by order at least 1 − δ.
Since the tangent line has a slope approximately equal to 1 2p(δm)
is of order at least (1 − δ m ) 1/4 , which is a contradiction.
A Faster Rate toward Strictly Individually Rational Payo Vectors
Although Proposition 6 shows that the rate of convergence can be as slow as (1 − δ) 1/4 , this result depends on both imperfect public monitoring and minmaxing. As we already discussed in Section 3, the rate of convergence is faster under perfect monitoring if we focus on strictly individually rational payo vectors. Here, we show that under imperfect public monitoring, the rate of convergence is at least as fast as (1 − δ)
1/2 toward strictly individually rational payo vectors that do not maximize any player's payo.
Proposition 7 Fix a nite stage game under imperfect public monitoring with the same individual and pairwise full rank conditions as in Proposition 5. Then for any B ⊆ F + , closed, such
-neighborhood of E(δ) for any δ < 1.
and anyx >x 0 .
Therefore, we have k(λ,x) ≥ k B (λ) for large enoughx.
The rest is the same as the proof of Proposition 5, except that we replace (1 − δ) 
-neighborhood of E(δ) for any δ < 1. Once again, the proof is similar to that of Proposition 5. At this time, we use the following property of k(λ,x). Lemma 6 There exists 
, respectively. of generality, we assume that λ 1 
. By Lemma 6, we can achieve the score
All is left to show is that w(y, δ) ∈ W (δ). By construction of W (δ), it suces to show that w(y, δ) belongs to the ball B(δ) with center v(δ) − r(δ)λ and radius r(δ). Note rst that
On the other hand, ∥w(y, δ)−v(δ)∥ is approximately bounded above by 2(1−δ) 2/3 . Therefore, for
By Lemma 4, we have w(y, δ) ∈ B(δ).
It is not dicult to modify the proof of Proposition 6 and show that the rate (1 − δ) 1/3 is tight for the prisoner's dilemma under imperfect public monitoring with full support.
All-or-Nothing Monitoring
Neither Proposition 4 nor 6 makes any special assumption on the imperfect monitoring structure. Assuming, for instance, that monitoring has a product structure does not help in terms of convergence rates; recall footnote 3.
However, these propositions assume that the monitoring has full support. Yet some natural examples of monitoring structures fail this assumption. All-or-nothing monitoring structures oer such an example. With probability q, players observe the chosen action prole perfectly, while with probability 1 − q, they see nothing. Formally, the set of public signals is given by Y = A ∪ {∅}, and π(· | a) assigns probability q to y = a and probability 1 − q to y = ∅. 
for all i = 1, . . . , n and a i ∈ A i . Then we have
for all i = 1, . . . , n and a i ∈ A i . Thus, v is enforceable under discount factor δ and all-or-nothing monitoring with q.
As a corollary, we can show that the rate of convergence under all-or-nothing monitoring is the same as that under perfect monitoring. More precisely, combined with Propositions 1 and 3, Lemma 7 implies that for any nite stage game under all-or-nothing monitoring with q > 0,
1/2 , and generically the right-hand side improves to K q (1 − δ). Imperfect monitoring in the form of all-or-nothing monitoring may aect the coecient K q , but does not aect the rate of convergence. 25 
Discussion
Our paper has shown that even when imperfect monitoring has no cost in terms of the limit equilibrium payo set, it has a cost in terms of the rate at which this set is approached.
" This result extends to more general monitoring structures: the probability that each action prole be perfectly observed can depend on the action prole as long as it is positive, and signals in the complementary event need not be completely uninformative.
# Note that imperfect monitoring does not improve the rate of convergence beyond perfect monitoring. This follows from Kandori (1992) if the public randomization device is available. Even without public randomization, one can easily extend Proposition 2 to all monitoring structures.
Specically, we show that the set of equilibrium payos converges to its limit at rate (1 − δ) One limitation in our analysis of imperfect public monitoring, as already pointed out, is the restriction to public strategies. Kandori and Obara (2006) show that the equilibrium payo set may expand strictly if we change the equilibrium concept from perfect public equilibrium to sequential equilibrium, thereby allowing for private strategies (although the dierence in equilibrium concepts is irrelevant for product monitoring, as discussed in footnote 3 and Section 4.5). The ideas behind the proofs of Propositions 4 and 6 rely on perfect public equilibrium. It $ Presumably, this question can be answered, given that the rate of convergence in approachability theory (on which he relies) has been thoroughly investigated, see Chen and White (1996) .
is certainly possible that regarding imperfect monitoring, allowing equilibria in private strategies could accelerate the rate of convergence beyond the results that we have derived. Delayed punishments in the spirit of Compte (1998) Finally, we note that we have taken the classical discrete-time limit. That is, we have analyzed the limit of the equilibrium payo set as δ → 1, keeping the monitoring structure xed.
Instead, one can take the continuous-time limit, where signals become less and less informative as δ → 1 (Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce, 1991 , Sannikov, 2007 , Sannikov and Skrzypacz, 2010 ).
We are not aware of any result on the rate of convergence in the continuous-time limit, but some of the tools and proof techniques in this paper may be applicable. , v j ) is a strict convex combination of (u i (â), u j (â)) and (u i (ã), u j (ã)) for someâ,ã ∈ A withâ ̸ =ã. Since v i is independent of u −i , λ is also independent of u −i generically (as long as u i (â) ̸ = u i (ã)).
Similarly, since v j is independent of u −j , λ is also independent of u −j generically. Thus, we can treat λ as a constant.
We assume without loss of generality thatâ i ̸ =ã i . Thus, this case is also nowhere dense.
